In considering the fate of Al Qaeda after the assassination of Usama bin Laden on May 2, 2011, several experts and analysts reported different opinions on the end or disappearance of the organization.
However, everyone agreed yesterday after the announcement of the killing of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, Deash’s leader, that the disappearance of al-Baghdadi does not mean the end of this organization.
Past experiences with contemporary terrorist organizations certainly have an important effect on this consensus as well as on the study of potential scenarios for Daesh.
There are many interpretations of this point.
Many see that terrorist ideology exists in social conditions that give it the means to survive, so that its life cycle is constantly shrinking and expanding.
This interpretation is largely correct and implies undeniable importance. But in my opinion, this is not the only factor in Al Qaeda’s survival to date. Nor will it be the only factor in Daesh’s survival, despite the death of its founder.
So what are the other causes that contribute to the survival of terrorist organizations?
My opinion is that ideas do not die by the death of their promoters. That is true, but who said that Baghdadi, and before him Bin Laden, have ideologies that can be transmitted between generations?
Research on the issue of ideological thinking may seem more obvious in the case of Baghdadi. Many authors agree that he was a “fortuitous leader,” a front for groups of exploiters and traffickers of religious slogans to achieve their political objectives or interests.
These beneficiaries could be individuals, interest groups, intelligence agencies, countries or all of them when public and hidden interests and agendas meet.
Baghdadi was not famous for his leadership skills. As described by those who knew him in previous periods of his life, he was an introvert with limited culture and religious knowledge.
This explains, to a large extent, how he only appeared on video twice over the years when his organization enjoyed global attention.
In addition, he has hired a special mufti of the organization to comment on doctrinal issues.
By his admission, Baghdadi was not described as a religious leader. This is the only attribute that could justify the organization’s leadership.
We are aware of his lack of military and administrative expertise and any other expertise required by his role as head of an alleged state that once gave itself jurisdiction over about seven million people and about 250,000 square kilometers of territory.
There is another reason why Daesh has been able to expand and develop.
Terrorism has taken the form of trade and a source of income for tens of thousands of young dreamers of a state or emirate that inhabits their limited religious imagination and culture.
They were interested in Daesh’s propaganda and recruitment methods based on the temptation of salary, housing and wife, not to mention women in captivity, well-being and other things contained in his videos that were circulating for some time on the Internet.
The materials used to recruit talented and creative people around the world have competed with those of multinational companies.
Anyone who denies the role of strong propaganda to bring thousands of young people to Daesh’s areas of influence must read some of the books and annotations on the subject.
These include “I was in Raqqa: The Fugitive from the Islamic State” by Tunisian writer Hedi Yahmed, who tells how a young Tunisian who emigrated to the country of the organization was shocked to think that the wheel of time would move him, once he crossed the geographical border of Turkey, to the time of the well guided caliphs, that the blessings were on them.
Whether the cause is the enabling environment, preconceived projects or even the strengthening of the organization through propaganda, Daesh remains a threat to all nations.
The idea will remain the same for many adventurers and ignorant people. Such practices and ideas have always existed in history, although their intensity and influence vary with time, political circumstances and other factors that aggravate or exploit the idea.
In addition, there are societal causes that contribute to varying degrees to the emergence of religious extremism at all times, old and new.
Similarly, mismanagement and failed development in the Arab and Islamic region are factors of survival for such catastrophic ideas.
Al Qaeda’s survival does not mean that it is as powerful and dangerous as it was. Experience has taught us that terrorist organizations replace each other.
The new one eliminates the “appeal” of the old one. Al Qaeda has destroyed the appeal of previous generations of terrorist organizations by moving from the local to the global.
Daesh swept away Al Qaeda’s influence through an approach of “management of savagery” and the construction of a so-called “Islamic caliphate” rather than focusing on the dialectics of the near and distant enemy.
In any case, the conflict between terrorist organizations and their generations is more tactical than strategic.
This is a dispute about the method, approach and tactics used. It is a disagreement that produces another parallel disagreement on leadership based on the right logic and therefore the right doctrine.
Those who reject Daesh’s approach are more likely to emerge and reject the theory of succession and “management of savagery,” preferring secret action and camouflage again.
Thus, the aim is to bring the life cycle of terrorism back to its origin after the failure of an experiment that some thought was the result of the success of these organizations.
