Have the US-Iran rules of engagement been changed?

The rules of engagement underlying US-Iran relations have changed, some experts argue, citing recent events and positions involving the two strategic adversaries.
Examples include the Iranian missile launches against Iraq’s Al-Asad base housing US troops, as well as the Iranian mullahs’ backing of anti-US Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro by sending five tankers carrying gasoline shipments.
Are these and other actions a sign that the rules of engagement between the two sides have evolved? Has the US been unable to prevent Iranian tankers from getting to the Caribbean and unloading their fuel in Venezuelan ports?
Basically, President Trump, I would say, is not a politician like any other. We know how much closer he is to the financial and business world. He believes in the logic of deals in handling international relations. Interests take precedence for him over political and strategic calculations.
So, Trump does not worry much about connotations of US prestige or influence, nor about the negative effect of his positions, decisions and policies on the optics of the US. Rather, he weighs each decision in terms of direct gains and losses, notwithstanding all indirect factors in the equation.
From this vantage point, one can understand almost all his decisions. He does not make much of a push to consolidate American deterrence, superiority, dominance and hegemony, and is satisfied with what interests him politically in domestic issues. What is more, the presidential elections scheduled for November are almost at hand. He is increasingly concerned about winning a second presidential term.
This is, it seems to me, the most important reason why he has let the Iranian oil tankers through. I am convinced that he will not make this deal without some kind of quid pro quo from the mullahs who are hooked on publicity, slogans and ideological din.
Certainly, behind the scenes, brokers could have arranged for Iranian tankers to dock in Venezuelan ports in exchange for something for the US.However, this analysis does not assume that Trump did not worry that if Iranian tankers were hit in the Caribbean, US Navy ships in the Gulf waters could face Iranian retaliation.
The man of deals understands that a suicidal-minded regime could go down that road. But he also knows that the regime puts its interests above all else. The regime could agree to a deal behind closed doors in order to get false publicity.
He also knows that any Iranian retaliation will put the Trump administration in a bad light at a critical moment, that he will have no choice but to launch a US military strike against Iran in response to any military operation against the US Navy in the Gulf waters.
Trump is not ready to make that decision now. He has therefore managed the situation with a businessman’s mind, following the logic of opportunity, not political strategy which gives weight to deterrence, influence, and status.
This is not to say that other major American decision-making institutions, such as the Pentagon, the US State Department and the US intelligence services, have no say here. But President Trump has managed to put together a team that adheres to his logic and his policies in international relations and in diverse areas in general.
As such, he does not often face objections from the US Department of Defense or the Department of Foreign Affairs. Added to this is his bellicose persona, with his individual style of decision-making, which pushes other institutions not to oppose his policies, especially if they are not related to major strategic decisions affecting the supreme interests of the US, but to some passing positions regarding the management of relations with a country that is no strategic match for the US.
We should remember, if we want to understand the rules of US-Iranian engagement, that what the mullahs’ regime described as a retaliation for the murder of Gen. Qassem Soleimani had deceived all supporters of the Iranian regime in the region. The response came as a timid and unnecessary response in military and combat terms.
In fact, it was merely a show designed to save the Iranian regime’s face. That wasn’t all. Media leaks considered that the Iranian leader’s decision to bomb the Ein al-Assad base was made after having informed the US, through an intermediary, of the timing and scale of the strike and agreeing on the details.
As for the reports that the Iranian missiles would have injured US troops at the base, they are accurate and have been recognized by the US itself. But these facts do not deny the existence of these agreements. Rather, they were due to American soldiers’ failure to hide and protect themselves during the strikes.
They misjudged the scope of the Iranian missile strikes and the risk of causing them indirect injuries such as concussions. Apparently, they thought it was just a slamming sound. So they did not take sufficient shelter during the bombing.
We should also remember that the mullahs’ regime is well aware of the political environment surrounding President Trump. It knows very well that he is restrained from taking the decision to hit the oil tankers at this time. This was seen as an opportunity for them to gain a few political points in the conflict with the US.
Objective attained, media-wise. But conflicts of this type are not solved by media buzz, but by the concrete results of each party on the ground. The fact is that the mullahs are still groaning under the siege. Their regime seems more tottering, notwithstanding the nine tons of gold it received in exchange for the oil shipments it sent to President Nicolas Maduro.




