Signals and hints of an understanding on all of the contentious issues in the Iran nuclear deal have been leaking out recently, especially after the announcement of the “satisfaction” reached between Washington and Moscow after the latter demanded a written commitment from the US to exempt its trade with Iran from US sanctions imposed on Russia over its invasion of Ukraine.
But right now, we have not seen any clear statements about its fate. Doubts about the possible signing of the agreement have resurfaced. There are few reports of Iranian and US statements bringing the issue to the forefront.
The current Iranian position focuses on accusing the US of delaying the signing of the agreement. “There is more than one outstanding issue, and the US is responsible for delaying the agreement because it is slow to give an answer that suits Iran,” Iran’s Foreign Ministry spokesman Said Khatibzadeh said recently.
“If Iran wants sanctions lifting that goes beyond the [deal, it] will need to negotiate those issues in good faith with reciprocity,” State Department spokesman Ned Price responded April 18. This statement is an implicit reference to the Administration’s concern about Iranian demands that go beyond the scope of the nuclear agreement negotiations.
This refers specifically to the demand that the Iranian Revolutionary Guard be removed from the US terror list. Both statements indicate that the negotiations have reached an impasse; at the very least, there is no agreement in sight under the current terms of the negotiations. It cannot be reached if Iran persists in its demand for the Revolutionary Guards.
It is clear that the Iranian regime’s nail-biting game with US negotiators is still on. Tehran is betting that the time factor is in its interest. It is not in the interest of President Biden, who, after a series of foreign policy failures, desperately needs a foreign policy win to present to the domestic public.
The White House is facing a US political environment less receptive to an agreement with Iran. The Ukraine crisis has shown that the US could face significant strategic challenges and strains if it ignores the security concerns of its partners, in this case the Gulf countries relating to Iran.
Dropping the IRGC from the terrorist list early, at the beginning of the Ukraine crisis, seemed to be a likely decision by the Biden administration. However, Gulf partners have shown growing dissatisfaction with the US attitude toward them.
This was reflected in the Gulf states’ weak support for Washington’s plans to pressure Russia over its military operations in Ukraine and, in particular, their rejection of the demand for increased oil production to offset the squeeze on Russian exports caused by the sanctions.
This was a clear signal that prompted President Biden to reconsider and possibly drop the idea, fearing the collapse of the US partnership with some Gulf states, particularly Saudi Arabia and the UAE. I believe that the fate of the Vienna negotiations is uncertain at this time. What is happening now on the Iranian and US sides is mutual pressure to make as many concessions as possible.
Moreover, given the growing displeasure of Republicans who strongly support the Israeli ally and their constant warning that any nuclear agreement with Iran would lose its legitimacy with the end of his term, President Biden has become more cautious about signing a possible “deal” with Iran. Domestically, there is a groundswell of movement to reject the agreement.
There is also unprecedented anger felt by Middle East and Gulf partners and allies. That turned the agreement into a political adventure with no assured consequences for the White House. Some even consider signing the deal as political suicide for the Dems.
We must emphasize that the experience of President Biden’s administration has declassified the Houthis as a terrorist organization, which has only added to the crisis in Yemen. The resolution did not serve US interests and did not fulfill the administration’s perceived goal of opening a negotiated path to resolving the crisis in Yemen.
This recent experience casts a shadow over Tehran’s demand to delist the IRGC. The specter of repeating the mistake and achieving the same disastrous results, as well as the high likelihood of a breakdown in US relations with its strategic partners in the Gulf region, clouds the situation.
We believe that the US role and policies in the Middle East need a comprehensive review to correct mistakes, not add new ones. A step that deepens the dispute with partners is not what needs to happen. But rather steps to restore trust and bridge rifts in terms of a strategic repositioning of the US.
Any new misstep would cost US interests dearly. It is not just a matter of officially handing Iran regional elbow room. But it is also a unique opportunity for Russia and China to effortlessly gain new ground in this important region.
On the other hand, many welcome the geostrategic changes in the world in the wake of the coronavirus and Ukraine crises, but that does not dismiss the importance of a strong role for the US and the other Western powers in taking the reins of world affairs.
The decline of this role does not serve the interests of the Middle East and the Gulf states in particular, especially since the regional powers grew overbearing as the region’s position in US strategic priorities slid.
All things considered, the balance of international powers within the framework of multipolarity may be the most appropriate equation that preserves interests, security, and stability for all.
