Amid the global pandemonium wreaked by the viral epidemic, the human and economic losses, and the revealed incapacity of the major powers in terms of health and social issues, a handful of researchers and specialists have begun to address how the coronavirus could change international relations.
For most of them, the coronavirus already marks a turning point in the current world order. The situation afterwards could be very different from what it was before. This point is entirely legitimate and relevant in view of the way the crisis has unfolded so far, particularly in economic terms. The most important thing, in my view, is the impact of the epidemic on the global power and influence structure in the post-Coronavirus era.
Can the US remain the monopoly of the world order? Will it be joined by other competitors such as China and Russia, creating a multipolar world? Perhaps a return to bipolarity (US and China) similar to what it was during the Cold War?
Or, for the first time, will the global coronavirus crisis lead to a decline in American influence as China takes over, so leading a new world order reconfigured according to global power structures and the outcome of the crisis, possibly even seeing some world powers rise and others wane?
My persuasion is that it is too early to draw conclusions about the strategic power relations in the post-Coronavirus era. The crisis is ongoing. It looks like it will take at least a few months to figure that out.
What we are seeing now are rapid developments that may be the tip of the iceberg of the economic impact of the crisis on all nations. However, that does not mean that we cannot do some good research and keep a close eye on what is going on. This is clearly an unprecedented global event with a profound impact on all countries. The situation will inevitably have strategic implications. At this stage, however, it is difficult to define them.
Another point on the table is what the elements of the overall power of States and their priority should be amidst this outbreak situation. Some experts believe that the vulnerability of some developed countries exposed by the crisis, countries whose health systems have crumbled suddenly in a way that does not suit their capacities and global standing, will lead to revised national security priorities.
The mapping of threats and sources of danger in the 21st century no longer centres on conventional warfare and armed conflict. The risks of nuclear war or global conventional military confrontation are getting smaller. Meanwhile, the threat levels of epidemics, disease, biological warfare and climate change have increased due to global warming, which the international community continues to ignore.
In addition, military threats themselves are no longer conventional. They have taken the form of unconventional conflicts against terrorist organizations and militias, and other phenomena such as cyber-terrorism, asymmetric warfare and other threats, most of which are not compatible with traditional military spending structures. Traditional military budgets still allocate astronomical sums of money to conventional equipment, warships and long-range missiles.
Global and national spending on health and armaments certainly lend themselves better to comparison. In 2019, global military spending jumped by 4 per cent over the previous year, the largest increase in the last decade, to $1.73 trillion. Global spending on health care stands at about $7.5 trillion per year.
A simple calculation suffices to show that the per capita amount of global health spending is about $975, while its share in defence spending is about $224, which means that global health spending is expected to be well placed in its overall global context. But this comparison is not objectively and effectively correct.
The big deal is not the size of global military and health spending. But it is the map of the distribution of military and health spending that is the crux of the problem. So, the volume of spending has really got to be compared with the needs in the two sectors. That way, you can get a clearer picture.
According to expert reports, basic health services still cover barely half of the world’s 7.7 billion people. About 925 million people spend more than 10% of their income on health care, of whom 200 million spend more than 25% of their annual income on health care.
Access to health care in low- and middle-income countries calls for an extra $200 billion a year.
One might say here that the health care crisis has not been limited to developing countries, quite the contrary. Western nations have seen their health systems suffer more as a result of the coronavirus crisis. But let us first admit that the epidemic hit hardest in China, in the US, in some European countries. As for the South, its prevalence has been more or less moderate. The health situation observed in some Western countries may be due to several factors; the question is not as simple as one might imagine.
The USA and the UK, for example, have two beds per 1,000 people, Germany has 5 and Japan 7.8. In terms of the number of doctors relative to the population, the US is badly short. The US has 2.6 doctors per 1,000 people. Germany has 4.3 doctors and Italy has 4 doctors per 1,000 people. However, the Americans have enormous capacity for quality diagnosis and treatment.
Sometimes, to put things in perspective, it is not only a matter of numbers, but also of qualitative capacities and scientific training. We need to take into account other variables that influence normative comparisons, such as the age structure of the population. About 30% of the population in Japan, for example, is over 65, compared with 22% in Germany. In this way, some of the factors behind higher public health expenditures make sense in some developed countries.
Ultimately, the coronavirus crisis will teach humanity a new lesson: all sources of danger and threat deserve a watchful eye and all national security concerns should receive proper attention, as medical supplies, masks and respirators have become a subject of global competition.
These concerns do not, however, affect the priority of military force. Military power is based not only on the gains of war, but also on the image and influence one wishes to project, the deterrence of strategic adversaries and competitors, the safeguarding of the sovereignty of States, their socio-economic achievements, and the protection of their territories. That is what history has taught us today and yesterday.
