I read an Arabic article by an Iranian that deems that the coalition countries are the ones who yielded Yemen to Iran then began denouncing its influence. The coalition countries, particularly the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), have for years adopted non-interference in the affairs of other nations and respected sovereignty which is a basis of international laws and legislation and norms. Non-interference in Yemen’s or other Arab countries affairs is not a negative disadvantage for the Gulf cooperation Council but a reflection of respect while the neighboring Iran does not respect the principles of international relations, nosing into the affairs of many neighboring and non-neighboring Arab countries.
The author says that Operations Decisive Storm and Restore Hope may have led to the growing popularity of the Houthi Ansar Allah group, which resulted in a growing Iranian influence in Yemen, and that Tehran’s relations not only consolidated with Ansar Allah movement but also with all those who refused to attack Yemen, alleging that there is information confirming the leaders of the Reform Society, a traditional ally of the alliance and the President Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi, joined Ansar Allah. This is typical of the Muslim Brotherhood, who supported Saddam Hussein during the invasion of the Kuwait. Their principles of the group stem from political opportunism and this is far from surprising.
The Iranian writer does not criticize his country’s position during the Houthi coup against the constitutional legitimacy but he criticizes instead the coalition countries who, according to him, did not seek reconciliation quickly, ignoring that one of the main criticisms to the Gulf Cooperation Council is remaining silent and hesitating for long until Sanaa fell in the hands of the Houthi group and the entire state collapsed after Houthi and his Iranian allies sought to expand to Aden and control the entire country. Until that time, the GCC countries did only call on a Houthi group’s commitment to peace and the decisions of international legitimacy. The United Nations and the resolutions are clear and reveal the GCC’s excessive self-restraint, while Tehran was encouraging Houthis to bring down constitutional legitimacy.
The writer says that Ansar Allah resorted to Iran after the GCC intervened and should not be blamed for what they have done. This is deceptive as everyone knows the nature of the relationship between the Houthi group and Iran that dates back to many years ago.
It is also deceptive what he says that Arab countries boycotted, imposed isolation and pressure on the Syrian regime that then resorted to Tehran. The writer is trying to convince readers that the Syrian regime’s relationship with Iran began after the imposition of Arab isolation, forgetting the long and deep strategic cooperation dating back to as far as the reign of former President Hafez al-Assad and his heir Bashar.
I may agree with the writer about the issue of lack of Arab support for Iraq after the fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003 and subsequent Iranian influence. But it was not an expression of orientation or an Arab decision to isolate Iraq, it was a strategic choice for the Iraqi government, which rejected cooperation with the Arab countries and became hostile to some GCC countries, especially Saudi Arabia. However, most Arabs realized the mistakes and tried to open their embassies in Baghdad and restore communication with the Iraqi people, but the Arab efforts had as much chance as Sunni Iraqis have inside their country.
The Oh Hussein campaign and the massive Iranian-led Shia Mobilization forces indicate the size of Iranian influence in Iraq and the sectarian policy pursued by Iran and the Iraqi government in dealing with the complex scene in Iraq.
The writer did not ask why is the Abadi government refusing to provide Iraq’s Sunnis with the necessary weapons to fight Daesh in the Sunni provinces and regions,or why this government’s insists on refusing to provide Kurdish Peshmerga forces with necessary weapons for the same reason. This legal nature of this position might be understood in terms of preserving the sovereignty of the Iraqi state and the exclusive use of weapons by the Iraqi National Army, but when the government allows arming some seventy thousand Shiite forces to counter Daesh in Iraqi Sunni areas, it becomes about sectarianism and factionalism. The Government of Iraq who arms the Shia also allows Gen. Qassem Soleimani to wander in the land of Iraq and take dozens of images amid his supporters, while the Arab role is completely absent.
Tehran’s outright interventions in several Arab countries is not an excuse used by Arabs to justify their failures, as claimed by the Iranian writer, but are a source of pride for Iranian politicians who boast that the country controls four Arab capitals.
In his article the author comes to the bottom line and reveals his real intentions as he calls Arabs for dialogue with Iran about the existing problem. Here I may understand the importance of civilized dialogue between countries, but when the author denies his country’s ambitions in these countries and confirms it intervened just in response to appeals for help, then why dialogue? What would be the basis of dialogue with Tehran? Should it be with the helping party or the party asking for help?
Before Iranians ask us Arabs to be rational, we advise Iranians to commit to the rules of good neighborliness, and to stop regional bullying and trying to impose a fait accompli by force. Tehran should be aware that the GCC countries are no longer a quiet, fearing neighbor. Decisive Storm was not just a military operation but a transformative station to deal differently with Iran, the regional power that is really just a paper tiger.
