Will a united Europe bear the brunt of the Ukraine crisis?

There are growing signs that the division on the European continent is widening over how to deal with Russia in the coming period. It looks like the coming winter will bring many developments on this front. As well, it looks like it will not only be European societies that will suffer from high energy prices.
But on this front, serious geopolitical consequences loom. There are increasing voices in Europe calling for a review of the sanctions policy imposed on Russia. Of course, the louder these voices become, the more determined the Kremlin will be to continue this war, in which, as President Putin himself pointed out yesterday, he has not lost much.
Whether President Putin’s goal is to fight democracy, as they say in the West, or to preserve his country’s sovereignty, as he himself keeps insisting, the result is that the world is in a protracted war; Europe’s energy malaise could continue for quite some time as the alternatives weaken.
More dangerously, the extremely troubling geopolitical environment could provide a valuable opportunity for the far-right in a number of European countries to take the lead, which would mean major qualitative changes in European foreign policy and potential turning points in international relations, since European policy has a significant influence on the structure of both the existing and the expected world order.
Of course, the spark of European change could come from some Eastern European capitals, as was the case with the recent demonstrations in the Czech Republic and Germany against rising energy prices. These demonstrations are likely to repeat and spread to other countries as the circumstances and data are similar.
As a result, some European capitals are tentatively moving toward a gradual circumvention of the sanctions policy imposed on Russia. We see signs of this in Bulgaria and Hungary. Perhaps also in Italy, whose elections this month will be a watershed moment in Europe.
EU officials in Brussels fear far-right tide and a tilt in the balance in favor of Russia. Moreover, sober opinion polls in Europe and elsewhere reveal a popular mood angry about the increased burden on life caused by the war in Ukraine, regardless of the strategic calculations of politicians and leaders.
There are deep disagreements in the European fold, including the differing views of France, Spain, and Germany on the MidCat gas pipeline, which Paris opposes activating. The project, launched in 2013 between Catalonia in northeastern Spain and southeastern France, failed due to a lack of agreement on funding and de facto support from France, not convinced of its feasibility.
This also coincides with the feasibility study commissioned by the European Commission in 2018, which concluded that the infrastructure, costing more than 440 million euros, is neither profitable nor necessary; the construction of the pipeline will take a long time and will not solve the immediate energy crisis in Europe. Some of the reports that noted the potential impact on the environment.
But the Spanish media does not speak from the same point of view, emphasizing France’s unease about the growing alliance between Spain and Germany. Reference is made here to the wars over Spanish “strawberries” that French farmers were not allowed to import into France, reopening old problems, such as support for the ETA movement in the last quarter of the twentieth century.
Russian Energy Minister Nikolay Shulginov says that the winter will show how much the EU believes in the possibility of renouncing Russian gas, adding that Europe will not be able to go without Russian gas because it will bring industry, including the chemical industry, to a standstill.
This life will be completely new for the Europeans who might not be able to say no as it it would be “too much” for them, he continued. Josep Borrel, head of European diplomacy, on the other hand, urges the EU to be strategically patient with the impact of sanctions against Russia.
This means that Russia will continue to test the limits of European restraint; the tug of war between the two sides will intensify in the next phase. Russian presidential spokesman Dmitry Peskov said European politicians have made so many mistakes for which they will have to pay. It is perhaps too early to assess the extent of the impact of the Russian gas crisis on the cohesion of the EU.
But there are a few clues as to what to expect.
Here we can think of President Macron’s calls to make Europe more powerful and sovereign, his proposal to create a political organization parallel to the EU that includes Ukraine, the UK, and Georgia to create space for political and security cooperation among European countries, and the apparent move toward a European political club away from the complexity of the Copenhagen standards and agreements that govern the EU.
This approach has the support and enthusiasm of Germany, which has shown great interest in strengthening its military power after the war in Ukraine.
Economy and security are no longer top priorities in Western Europe, which brings to the fore speculation about a possible exit of France from the EU (Frexit), especially at the beginning of the rise of Marie Le Pen “Madame Frexit,” who also called for another European organization based on protectionist policies, especially in the field of migration and trade.
But the motives here are quite different. With the dynamics of the European attitude towards Russia and the question of how to shape relations with this country in the future, a new momentum is being set in motion.




